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"Let Us Become Human through Beef and Pork": 
Atheist Humanism and the Aesthetics of Caste 
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st.binder@gmail.com 
The so-called Cow Protection Movement, its legal manifestation in bans 
on cow slaughter, and its central significance in the formation and 
symbolism of religious nationalism and communal violence have a long 
history in India reaching back to colonial times (van der Veer 1994). 
Recently, it has sparked renewed public attention due to repeated 
attacks and violent murders perpetrated by Hindu right-wing "cow pro-
tectors" against primarily Muslim and Dalit persons accused of killing 
cows and consuming or storing beef.1 Instead of placing the conten-
tious issue of beef consumption into the context of current debates 
about 'Indian secularism'2 and Hindu nationalism, I will approach it in 
this article from a different—in a sense opposite—perspective: the 
perspective of explicitly irreligious people who criticise and try to over-
come communalism by mobilising a social imaginary or an "aesthetic 
formation" (Meyer 2009) of atheist humanism. This article explores the 
complex ways in which transgressive, anti-communalist prandial prac-
tices and in particular anti-caste practices relate to embodied senti-
ments and materialised settings of communal division; it thereby seeks 
to add another layer to analyses which tend to foreground questions of 
political and (anti-)religious ideology. 
Concretely, I analyse a historical event of public beef and pork con-
sumption which was conducted in 1972 by the Atheist Centre (Nastika 
Kendram)3, an atheist organisation in Vijayawada (Andhra Pradesh), 
as part of its larger and still ongoing endeavours to annihilate the 
caste-system. The slogan for this event was: "Let us become Human 
through Beef and Pork" (Gora 1972c: 1). I argue that the public 
ingestion of beef as well as other atheist anti-caste programmes 






























'publicness'—that is a form of material, spatial, and affective percep-
tibility—for performing not only transgressions of caste boundaries but 
also an alternative form of humanist interaction which atheists call 
"human mingling." This notion, however, does not refer to just any 
kind of interaction between any kind of human being but to a public 
atheist practice which occurs within concrete physical and affectively 
structured spaces at whose social construction it consequently partici-
pates. Human mingling produces therefore a very specific form of 
atheist humanist 'castelessness', where human beings are not—and do 
not necessarily feel—equal in an abstract or absolute sense; rather, 
existing hierarchies persist by being transformed into differential 
agency and distributed sentiments. 
The Atheist Centre and the Production of Humanist Publicness  
The Atheist Centre is a prominent institution within a larger and diver-
se movement of allied atheist (nastika), rationalist (hetuvada), and hu-
manist (manavavada) movements in the Telugu speaking regions of 
South India (for better readability, the word 'atheist' refers in the fol-
lowing to the whole movement). The Centre was founded in 1940 by 
Goparaju Ramachandra Rao (1902–75) and his wife Saraswathi Gora 
(1912–2006) in a small village called Mudunuru in Andhra Pradesh 
(Krishna district) and was shifted to the district capital of Vijayawada 
in 1947. As is common among atheists, the Gora family has renounced 
its caste, and Goparaju Ramachandra Rao officially changed his name 
to Gora in order to remove all associations with his and his family’s 
former Brahmin caste. Besides explicitly anti-religious propagation and 
a diverse range of social reform projects as well as developmental acti-
vism, the Atheist Centre has since its very inception engaged in endea-
vours to annihilate caste, for example, by conducting inter-caste mar-
riages, organising cosmopolitan dinners, or renaming Dalit settlemen-
ts. On its website, the Atheist Centre describes itself with the following 
mission statement: "Atheist Centre is a social change organization 
striving for eradication of superstitions, inculcating rational, scientific 
and secular outlook for spreading positive atheism and humanism as a 
way of life (life-stance)."4 
Atheists often consider humanism, as a philosophy and the given of 
a shared humanity, to be the opposite of caste and religious divisions 
and thus both the foundation and envisioned outcome of atheist acti-
vism. Gora’s eldest son Lavanam (1930–2015), himself a renowned 






























atheism and humanism very succinctly by defining the former as a 
"human-centred" as opposed to a "god-centred" approach to life: 
Atheism is not mere denial of the existence of god or criticism of 
religious texts or exposing the superstition; […] In reality, Athe-
ism aims at building up a new society based on freedom, equality, 
fraternity and justice. Atheism aims at complete elimination of 
exploitation in social, economic and all other fields. Atheism 
destroys the barriers of caste, race and religion and all other ine-
qualities […]. It turns attention from imaginary god to the reality 
of social situations and for [sic] the establishment of equality and 
freedom. (Lavanam n.d.: 22–3) 
Atheism is thus seen less as a negative turning away from god(s) than 
a positive turning towards society as both the real foundation of hu-
man life and the object of service, reform, and improvement (cf. Gora 
1972d and Gora 1989); in other words, since society is human-made, 
it can also be unmade and remade. It is against the background of 
such conceptualisations of atheism as essentially a form of humanist 
social reconstruction (sanghanirmanam)—rather than merely theologi-
cal or epistemological criticism of religion—that the annihilation of 
social divisions based on caste has gained centre stage in atheist acti-
vism. In the following, I will look at the notion of humanist social 
reconstruction through the example of a specific anti-caste program-
me, namely a "Beef and Pork Friendship Function" organised by the 
Atheist Centre on its own premises in 1972. 
In late June of the same year, and against the larger historical can-
vas of the third Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the Atheist Centre started 
advertising a programme of public beef and pork eating via its own 
journals, daily newspapers, pamphlets, mouth-to-mouth propaganda, 
and posters in public spaces. In the July issue of his English monthly 
called The Atheist, Gora announced the details of the programme and 
described its rationale: 
Owing to the antiquity of her civilisation, castes and communities 
have settled down in India in isolated groups. The isolation was 
natural in early times when communications were not well devel-
oped. But the isolations are not only outmoded in the modern 
world but are inimical to the evolution of one-humanity. Further 
the isolations are the cause of the present riots and conflicts that 
disturb peace and progress. Therefore the following programme is 
formulated to pull down the isolations and to facilitate free min-
gling of people. Food habits of caste and communities in India are 
the material distinctions that keep up isolations. For instance, 






























the Vaishnavite community tabus [sic] onions also. Bengali Brah-
mins eat fish but taboo meat. Hindus, other than Harijans, taboo 
beef while Muslims taboo pork. At the time of communal riots, a 
cow and a pig fall as the first victims. For they are slaughtered 
and their blood and flesh are spilt in the quarter of the opposite 
community, taking mischievous pleasure in offending their senti-
ments. Now, this programme breaks the outmoded sentiment and 
removes the cause of meaningless offence. (Gora 1972a: 1) 
He continued with the details of date, time, and venue and then pro-
ceeded to describe the intended programme: 
So on that day two plates of bits of well-cooked beef and pork will 
be kept on a table along with plates of cooked rice and baked 
bread. The size of the bits of beef and pork will not be bigger than 
one cubic centimetre. The participants are requested to take one 
bit of pork and one bit of beef and eat them together openly with 
morsels of rice or bread as they like. [...] It is not a dinner or a 
sumptuous meal. It is an open protest against the antiquated 
sentiments in food habits that have kept the communities conflic-
tingly apart (ibid.: 1-2, emphasis in original). 
Gora furthermore announced his intention to invite the press to the 
event and, after its completion, to publish a list with the names of all 
participants. He stressed repeatedly that the function was not designed 
to offend anybody but, by contrast, to remove the cause of "meaning-
less offence" once and for all. Because India’s official "policy of live and 
let live each community with its own sentiments" had failed it was time 
to take public action "in the spirit of opening a new chapter in human 
relations" (ibid.: 2). Even though readers might feel hesitant because 
of their revulsion against beef or pork—or meat in general—Gora urged 
them to participate and stressed the small size of the morsels of meat; 
these should be considered "bitter pills of medicine" (ibid.), which will 
heal society’s ills of communal violence between castes and religions. 
The August issue of The Atheist appeared still before the event and 
opened with an article by Gora, in which he described the unantici-
pated amount of both positive and negative reactions stirred by his 
previous announcement: two people had gone on hunger strike next to 
the Atheist Centre in order to protest the programme and critical hand-
bills and posters had been distributed in its vicinity. Among those ob-
jecting to the event were Vishva Hindu Parishad, Arya Samaj, Jeeva 
Raksha Sangham (an animal welfare organisation), Christian Society 
for Animals and, on behest of the Shankaracharya of Puri, the 
Gandhian Sarva Seva Sangh. The latter had requested Gora to declare 






























daya" (Gora 1972b: 1), and the Shankaracharya’s followers had threa-
tened to hold a counter-satyagraha unless Gora desisted from his 
plans.5 
At the same time, however, there were also a number of positive 
responses. Within the fold of supporters, Gora (1972c) mentioned a 
few individuals by name as well as the Indian Secular Society, Indian 
Atheist Society, Atheists’ Congress at Hyderabad, Sama Samaj Nir-
mana Sadan, and Bheem Patrica. As a sign of support, members and 
sympathisers of the atheist movement replicated the programme in 
various towns of Andhra Pradesh as well as neighbouring Tamil Nadu 
and published the names and number of their participants (Gora 
1972b; The Atheist 1972a & 1972b; Kasturi 1972). Eventually, the 
programme had to be carried out under police protection based on 
Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Out of a total of 300 
attendees, 136 participated actively by ingesting beef and pork during 
the function. 
By looking more closely at the criticisms as reported by Gora as well 
as his retorts, it is possible to gauge the significance of this pro-
gramme. Besides arguments for non-violence and against animal 
cruelty, the main objections were at first sight seemingly contradic-
tory. On the one hand, the Atheist Centre was criticised for blowing the 
issue of food habits out of proportion; food habits were, after all, 
merely a matter of custom or individual preference and thus an 
inadequate subject for a political and social reform programme. On the 
other hand, the programme was deemed dangerous because it would 
recklessly and out of sheer pettiness offend and enrage the sentiments 
of various communities. Gora pointed out the inconsistency of these 
reactions, because they belittled food habits as insignificant trifle and, 
at the same time, credited them with inordinate power to provoke vio-
lence. 
Gora himself, however, seemed to replicate this apparent inconsis-
tency by framing food habits as merely material signs of an obsolete 
yet still threateningly powerful form of social organisation based on 
division, isolation, and hierarchy. As the quotes above show, he cha-
racterised the sentiments attached to food as "antiquated", "out-
moded" and "meaningless." Gora furthermore emphasised the 
symbolic function of the event by clarifying that "it is not a dinner or a 
sumptuous meal" (Gora 1972c: 2). Reacting especially to the argu-
ments about non-violence, he stressed that he and his entire family 






























question remains, then, why critics as well as supporters of the pro-
gramme construed practices around food simultaneously as trifling 
symbols and as a source of potent sentiments and violence. After all, 
what is the actual offence caused by the Beef and Pork Friendship Fun-
ction? What exactly do atheists want to transgress by breaking religi-
ous and caste-based food restrictions? 
For Gora, the event was symbolic because its purpose was not at all 
to break specific food restrictions or change actual dietary habits, but 
to affect social change by transgressing publicly and tangibly—escu-
lently, as it were—a whole social order based on affectively charged 
and institutional forms of "sectarianism":  
There is only one do and don’t which is most important and signi-
ficant in human affairs. It is 'Do what you say, and say what you 
do.' This "Do" insists upon the openness of conduct. The corres-
ponding "Don’t" is secrecy and sectarianism. [...] Except open-
ness of conduct, the ways of dress and diet should be treated as 
traifles [sic] and left to individual tastes. […] Only those dos and 
don’ts are just and proper which allow humans to mingle with 
fellow humans with equal respect and opportunity. All other dos 
and don’ts that prevent a human mingling with another human 
are wrong, outmoded and inimical to the progress of civilization. 
(Gora 1972c: 2) 
As it turns out, we are here not dealing with transgressions of parti-
cular prohibitions of beef for Hindus, pork for Muslims, meat for certain 
castes, fish or onions for others et cetera, but with a transgression of 
rules as such or, more specifically, rules which obstruct the progress of 
civilisation towards the telos of a homogeneous social body. What Gora 
calls "human mingling" or hyphenated "one-humanity" is not the sheer 
co-presence of unmarked human bodies—of bodies marked as nothing 
but human—but a specific form of social interaction which is opposed 
to "sectarianism." The quality of this interaction and with it the Beef 
and Pork Friendship Function’s potential for offence—from the Atheist 
Centre’s perspective, its potential for social transformation—did not 
reside in the act of ingesting beef and pork as such, but in the specific 
and concrete form of 'publicness' it created through a performative 
event and through the mediatisation of that event in newspapers, jour-
nals, handbills et cetera: 
Some transgress the tabooes [sic] in private life for reasons of 
taste or health. But such private acts do not promote social chan-
ge. Hence the openness of the function. [...] After all, the pro-






























should attract all people into its fold ultimately. We invite the 
press in giving the programme the publicity it deserves and help 
the cause of resolving conflicts and promoting harmony. (Gora 
1972a: 2) 
A number of scholars has pointed out the need to 'provincialize' 
(Chakrabarty 2000) the seemingly universal notions of public and pri-
vate by going beyond European political philosophy and paying atten-
tion to actual politics of space and practices of publicness. Robert 
Frykenberg (2008), among others, has argued that public spaces in 
India have traditionally been communal spaces, access to which has 
been regulated and restricted by "distinctions between things 'pure' 
and 'impure'" (ibid.: 289)—including human beings (cf. also Viswanath 
2014). Other examples from India show how the dichotomy of pub-
lic/private is being complicated by similar yet not quite congruent 
dichotomies such as the Tamil akam/puram (inner/outer), the Bengali 
ghare/baire (at home/outside), or the Hindi apna/paraya (mine/other) 
(Chakrabarty 1991; Kaviraj 1997; Bate 2010).  
The rationale behind the Atheist Centre’s Beef and Pork Friendship 
Function is to create a social scenario in which it is possible to perform 
a notion of publicness which is characterised by "openness of conduct" 
and whose opposite is not privacy but "secrecy and sectarianism." In 
Positive atheism, Gora’s last book and one of the most concise sum-
maries of his philosophy, he explains not only why privacy is irelevant 
for atheist activism but also why sectarianism and, perhaps somewhat 
counterintuitively, also secrecy are in fact public: 
Secrecy is different from privacy. Privacy is a personal matter in 
which others are little interested. […] Secrecy is an escape from 
social obligation. It results from a desire for selfish advantage or 
from a sectarian outlook. Members of a group are honest among 
themselves, but are often dishonest with others. Casteism, com-
munalism, racism, nationalism and gangsterism are examples of 
sectarian behaviour. In the context of wider social relations, sec-
tarianism is as dishonest as secrecy. (Gora 1972d: 48–9) 
I argue that the goal of the Beef and Pork Friendship Function, and 
atheist activism more generally, is to contest particular embodied, 
materialised, and institutional forms of social differentiation based on 
"secrecy and sectarianism"—whatever the concrete forms, belief-sys-
tems, or epistemic claims in which these may manifest (casteism, 
communalism, racism, nationalism, gangsterism et cetera). As a 
result, humanism appears here as a form of publicness which refers to 






























aesthetic, and which is therefore not constituted in contradistinction to 
the private. The goal of atheist activism is to transgress and thereby 
transform a "community of sentiment" (Appadurai 1990: 93) or an 
"aesthetic formation" (Meyer 2009)6 which produce particular kinds of 
social distinction crystallising, in the case at hand, around the materia-
lity of food practices and the different interpretations of their entangle-
ments with social formations (caste, religion, nation), bodily reactions 
(revulsion), ethical values (honesty, selfishness, social obligation), and 
affective intensities (sentiments). In the second part of the article, I 
want to focus particularly on the affective dimensions of atheist huma-
nism and its public scenarios of "human mingling", as they are ima-
gined, articulated, and produced in the context of concrete endeavours 
to annihilate caste. 
 
The Affective Dimension of Atheist Humanism 
Although Gora and the critics of his Beef and Pork Friendship Function 
ultimately agreed on the trivial nature of food habits, they nonetheless 
credited them with the power to incite intense and potentially harmful 
sentiments. Irrespective of whether sentiments are seen as outmoded 
and meaningless or as a justified reaction to a suffered offence, they 
are what atheists wanted to protest and break, and what their critics 
wanted to respect and protect. In order to further unpack the affective 
dimension of the scenarios created through atheist anti-caste, or 
rather anti-sectarian programmes, it is necessary to have a closer look 
at the nature of the sentiments evoked through atheist discourses and 
practices. 
At a more abstract level, biographic and autobiographic narratives of 
my atheist interlocutors in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana construe 
atheism primarily as a matter of heroism. Their accounts and narrate-
ves are full of laudatory phrases extolling individuals for "having the 
guts" to profess their atheism, which continues to be a very negatively 
loaded term and may cause social ostracism and opposition from fami-
lies, caste communities, orthodox authorities, Hindutva forces, or sim-
ply society in general. Beyond questions of concrete religious beliefs, 
cosmologies or ritual compliance, lived atheism, as both a personal 
way of life and a project of social reconstruction, often appears as a 
form of emotional work which is grounded in more than a reactive 
steadfastness in the face of social opposition. 
I would like to illustrate this point with another account of "human 






























Gora. He was born in 1946 into a Muslim family as S. Muhammad 
Shariff and grew up in Brahmanakotukur, a small village in Kurnool 
district. Currently, he lives in Hyderabad and is a dedicated activist in 
many different atheist groups and organisations; among other things, 
he is a marriage broker for casteless and nonreligious marriages. Since 
Gora is one of the most famous atheist intellectuals in the region, 
Shariff Gora had decided to adopt that name as a sign of his public 
commitment to atheism. The following quote is an excerpt from one of 
our interviews, where he explains that one of the reasons for choosing 
his new name were Gora’s achievements in the practical realisation of 
atheism and, in particular, his fight against the caste-system: 
This man [Gora], he lived in the untouchable colony. Really, you 
won’t believe. Now, it may be developed, but imagine 60, 70 
years back. […] I am telling you, I used to go to do some work in 
untouchables’ area. I would not go in, deeply inside that. I used 
to be at the border of that and then I shout: "Balchandra, ra!" 
[B., come here!] I used to shout his name. He used to come like 
this: "Em dora?" [What is it, master?] Because in those days they 
were treated as very downtrodden people. They should respect 
upper caste people: "Ah, em dora, endukoccinaru?" [What is it, 
master, why did you come?]. 
Like that he used to say. […] There was a very filthy atmosphere 
there: no hygiene, nothing, dirty, dirty water is flowing in 
between their houses, lots of mosquitoes, dogs, pigs, roaming all 
around. In such an area, going and living with them, dining with 
them and giving your daughter—upper caste, this man [Gora]—
giving the daughter to such people is no regular thing, now also 
[it is] a challenge.7 Many people cannot do that. Gora’s work, he 
has gone with that: "I am an atheist, Nenu nastikunni. God is not 
there. This religion is man-made. We are all equal people. We are 
all brothers." 
Like that he hugged the untouchable people. That created a very 
big impact on (untouchable) people. Such a learned man and 
educated man going into that, such a situation, and making them 
feel that you are all equal to me. So that type of work how many 
people are doing it? Even Gandhi had not done it. He only told: 
"There are no untouchables." [...] But what has he done? [...] 
But, Gora has done it practically. This type of social injustices he 
tried to remove.8 
What differentiates Gora’s atheism from other critiques of the caste 
system or professions of humanism—in this case Gandhi’s—is that 
Gora did not just talk; he "has done it practically." Moreover, the signi-
ficance of atheist anti-casteism is emerging here first and foremost via 






























put into practice: the 'topos'—in a literal as well as tropological sense—
of the 'filthy untouchable colony'. Shariff Gora’s description of Gora’s 
transgression of caste boundaries demonstrates palpably how caste is 
not only a religiously or customarily sanctioned body of rules but an 
affectively charged, embodied, and spatially inscribed social institution. 
Similar to the Beef and Pork Friendship Function, his account evokes a 
scenario of atheist practice which makes it very clear that the rationale 
and intended outcome of Gora’s efforts is human equality; but this 
effort occurs neither between abstractly equal people nor within a neu-
tral, presumably 'secular' space.9 The concrete spaces and scenarios in 
which practices of "human mingling" are being performed are not a 
neutral background or container; they are the merging of physical 
space, spatial imaginaries, and existing relations of power into a den-
sely structured, spatially and temporally determined, aesthetic forma-
tion of atheist humanism. 
In Shariff Gora’s account, which is a narrative of praise, Gora is an 
exceptional and indeed heroic figure because he overcomes social con-
strictions and pressures as well as powerful embodied aversions, as he 
enters unflinchingly into physical proximity—and even affinal kinship—
with the "downtrodden" and "untouchables"; a "challenge" few people 
are able to master. Gora’s heroism is here inversely mirrored in the 
sentiments of lowliness and submissiveness on the part of the "untou-
chables" and their deferential and respectful language ("What is it, 
master?"). The aim of atheist activism is thus not only to generate 
atheist heroism but also to transform that humility into sentiments of 
equality, self-assertion, and self-respect. Within a larger discursive fra-
mework of atheism, for which Shariff Gora’s account is here only one 
example, this transformation usually remains conditional on the bene-
volent intervention of atheist activists; their "untouchable" counter-
parts, by contrast, are frequently represented as lacking any agency to 
claim or develop svabhimanam (self-respect) on their own. In other 
words, Gora’s heroism in his interaction with Dalits—his "human min-
gling"—is intrinsically bound up with his agency to 'make others' feel 
equal.  
I frequently came across such memories, accounts, or vignettes of 
atheist transgressions of caste boundaries, which almost unvaryingly 
replicate this structure of distributed sentiments and agency. Another 
example is a conversation I had with one of Gora’s daughters, Mythrie, 
who explained to me that the Gora family had always made it an expli-
cit point to shake hands with all visitors coming to the Atheist Centre, 






























lips touch the glass. Mythrie narrated how people from "low-caste" and 
"untouchable" backgrounds were particularly hesitant in their inter-
actions, but they were literally 'made' to have self-respect, for exam-
ple, by asking them to sit down on a chair of equal height rather than 
stand or crouch on a low stool. 
As Mythrie explained these things to me, she started re-enacting 
such a situation and said in a suddenly very stern and serious voice: 
"No! You sit! If I sit, you sit. If I sit on the floor, you also sit on the 
floor. If I sit on a chair, you also sit on a chair!" Pointing her finger 
demandingly at the chair next to hers: "We will not talk unless you sit 
down!" Then her features relaxed again, she smiled, and went on with 
our conversation. While Mythrie is a very warm and cordial person, she 
can certainly command great authority if required. She explained that 
at the Atheist Centre everybody was treated as part of their family, the 
occasional international visitor as well as their kitchen help. Regardless 
of whether or not some of their hired staff even understand it fully, 
they were treated on equal terms and as members of the family. And 
yet, what kind of equality and self-respect are actually produced in 
such interactions? 
I argue that these interactions and practices as well as accounts of 
"human mingling" are not about 'interior' feelings of equality and self-
respect but about the creation of scenarios where people can interact 
outside the ambit of hierarchies established 'a priori' by differences of 
castes and religions; this, however, does not automatically preclude 
that people have gained unequal degrees of eminence or command 
unequal degrees of authority and agency. In other words, these sce-
narios are not meant to establish feelings of abstract, unconditional 
equality but a community of sentiment where humans interact as 
'equal with regard to castes and religions'. They are occasions for 
atheists to perform humanism by transforming inequalities and hierar-
chies based on castes and religions into differentially distributed public 
sentiments of heroism, self-respect, eminence, appreciation, praise et 
cetera. 
Sentiments can be 'distributed' in this way precisely because they 
are public rather than interior to the psyche of individuals. I am aware 
that the scenarios and sentiments I have mentioned so far, including 
the Beef and Pork Friendship Function, are all in a sense narrated, that 
is, they are accounts of sentiments. I approach sentiments here simi-
larly to how literary scholar Sianne Ngai (2005, 38–88) conceptualises 






























actual social relations and the ideology underpinning them. Ngai uses 
the Heideggerian notion of attunement (Stimmung) in order to add an 
aesthetic and affective dimension to Louis Althusser’s (2014: 184) dis-
cussion of how ideology, defined as "an imaginary relation to real 
[social] relations", is materialised in ideological apparatuses. Interes-
ting for my discussion of sentiments is Ngai’s argument that the tone 
of a text is located neither in the reader’s feelings nor in the feelings of 
characters represented within the text; rather, the tonality of a text—
qua materialised and affective ideology—accomplishes an attunement 
between imaginary and real social relations precisely by confounding 
the location of feelings: "[T]one is a feeling which is perceived rather 
than felt and whose very nonfeltness is perceived. There is a sense, 
then, in which its status as feeling is fundamentally negative, regard-
less of what the particular quality of affect is" (Ngai 2005: 76, empha-
sis in original). 
By distinguishing feeling and perceiving as different modes of expe-
riencing a sentiment, and by including even an experience of "nonfelt-
ness", it becomes possible to approach atheists’ accounts of senti-
ments in terms of the ideological work they perform. I argue that 
accounts of interactions, just like interactions themselves as well as 
the material things these involve—morsels of meat, unhygienic envi-
ronments, drinking vessels, chairs et cetera—are ways to make sen-
timents public by making them perceptible, rather than felt. Accounts 
of 'castelessness', professions of atheism, or declarations of humanist 
equality which either accompany scenarios in real time or produce 
them retrospectively perform the important ideological work of relating 
'real' interactions to imaginaries of humanism; in other words, ac-
counts are an instrumental part of realising atheist humanism as an 
actual aesthetic formation, among other things by distributing public, 
that is perceptible, sentiments. The crucial question is not whether the 
people with whom Mythrie or Gora interacted really 'felt' self-respect 
but whether they sat down on a chair of equal height and thus 'perfor-
med' it; in the same way as the Beef and Pork Friendship Function was 
not about making meat part of one’s daily diet or even about over-
coming bodily aversions to beef and pork, but about a public act of 
ingesting them anyways, namely as "bitter pills of medicine" and as a 
performance of "one-humanity." 
I do not mean to imply, however, that such ideological work is 
always felicitous or that it is enough to simply name or narrate senti-
ments in order to distribute them. Besides the successful accounts 






























ways in which caste can 'stick' to both upper and lower caste people ir-
respective of their attempts at verbal or practical disavowal, transfor-
mation, and distribution. The Atheist Centre itself is a striking exam-
ple: its disavowal of caste is widely known and can hardly be denied, 
but it is still remembered—or rather perceived—that the Goras had 
once been Brahmin. 
Nau, Saraswathi’s and Gora’s youngest daughter and current 
director of one of their NGOs for rural development, narrated to me 
how her parents had tried to implement a feeding programme in a 
nearby Dalit colony, where they wanted to provide food to the local 
residents. She told me that the people there had been suspicious and 
rejected the food, and that it had taken her parents a lot of time and 
great effort to eventually gain their trust. I was surprised, for anthro-
pological literature would suggest that food transactions are proble-
matic when food moves from 'lower' to 'upper' castes and not the 
other way around. Nau, however, explained that Dalits had not under-
stood why "these people", that is evidently upper caste people, sud-
denly came and gave them food when they had experienced so much 
oppression and violence from upper castes in the past. Thus, the mere 
physical presence of upper caste people in a Dalit colony and their 
intention to mingle as casteless humans does not automatically trans-
form previous experiences of caste distinctions into distributed senti-
ments of heroism and self-respect, as suggested by Shariff Gora’s 
account above.  
Many outsiders refer to the Gora family as peddavallu, a Telugu 
term for great or eminent people, which does not have to but can refer 
to caste status. From the perspective of the Atheist Centre, its status 
is in no way related to the Goras’ Brahmin past but to their merit 
which is even heightened precisely by their voluntary abdication of all 
caste privileges. The Goras are eminent people for many reasons like, 
for example, their earlier participation in the freedom struggle, their 
unflinching dedication to practical Atheism, their consistent involve-
ment in social service activities, or their prominence in local and regio-
nal media. And yet, there are critics of the Atheist Centre, even within 
the atheist movement, who claim that despite all its anti-untouchability 
programmes the Atheist Centre has always remained a "Brahmin 
agraharam"10 and that it propagated "Brahmin atheism." Such accusa-
tions of casteism were initially puzzling to me, given the more than 60 
year-long history of the Atheist Centre’s categorical and unequivocal 






























In any case, the Atheist Centre is by no means the only atheist 
organisation which has to face such allegations, as it is very common 
within the atheist movement to accuse rivalling individuals or organisa-
tions of lingering practices and sentiments of casteism. The Rationalist 
Society of India, for instance, is sometimes dismissed as a group of 
"Kamma rationalists", just as other groups with closer ties to the Am-
bedkarite movement are disparaged as "Dalit atheists." Since accusa-
tions of casteism are indeed pervasive within the atheist movement, 
the question arises whether the transformation of caste hierarchies 
into distributed sentiments does indeed qualify as an annihilation of 
caste—which is, after all, what atheist anti-caste programmes are pro-
fessedly aiming for. It would thus be necessary to clarify at which point 
the change of a particular form of social organisation is 'radical' 
enough to qualify as its annihilation. In what follows, however, I argue 
that the way this question is posed already presupposes caste as an 
external object of atheist programmes, whereas it is methodologically 
sounder to conceive the relationship between atheism and caste as one 
of mutual implication within concrete, materialised aesthetic forma-
tions.  
Conclusion: Atheist Humanism and the Persistence of Caste 
Satish Deshpande (2014) has identified the political aftermath of the 
Mandal Commission Report in the 1980s as a major turning point for 
public discourses on the role of caste in modern India. Previously, the 
predominant mode of talking about caste had been marked by nationa-
list narratives of transition: from colonialism to independence, from 
feudalism to capitalism, from tradition to modernity, and indeed from 
the caste system to its annihilation. Deshpande argues that after the 
Mandal Commission a new sensibility vis-à-vis caste has emerged, a 
sensibility which is no longer expecting an "imminent transition" but 
assumes the continuity of caste in various, transfigured forms: "[Cas-
te] is not a virtue or a vice but rather a contextual frame that inevita-
bly colours everything within it" (ibid.: 11). Recent literature on socio-
religious reform movements in colonial and post-colonial India has 
consequently shown that social reform has been to a very large extent 
an upper caste and upper-/middle class endeavour, which has fre-
quently ended up reproducing and even reinforcing the very power 
relations it set out to dismantle in the first place (Nanda 1985; Kishwar 































This change from transition to continuity as the guiding motif in 
speaking about caste is of crucial significance for atheists, as they con-
tinue to aim for its complete annihilation but do so within an altered 
overall discursive framework. Once caste is conceived as a "contextual 
frame that inevitably colours everything within it" (Deshpande 2014: 
11) and as reproducing itself perpetually, endeavours to annihilate it 
must appear doomed from the start. While some self-evident and 
clearly identifiable forms of caste have in fact been criminalised and 
may have subsided over the last decades, caste has been perceived to 
reappear in more slithery and diffuse but no less sticky forms; caste 
has become indeed a "colour" or, in Ngai’s words, a "tone" of social 
relations, which may persist even when casteism is explicitly disavo-
wed. It is common among my interlocutors to attribute the tenacious 
persistence of caste discrimination to the cause that, despite all efforts 
of reform, caste is simply "in the blood" of Indians. The focus on the 
historical and political adaptability and persistency of caste enables its 
critique at a more sophisticated level, yet simultaneously seems to 
foreclose the possibility of actually getting rid of it for good. 
Vivek Dhareshwar argues that the possibility to do disavow caste is 
anyways restricted to an upper caste and upper class subject position, 
which is able to effectively displace—in my words 'distribute'—expe-
riences and practices of caste onto those at the bottom of the cas-
te/class hierarchy: "To speak about caste, or to theorize it, in English, 
in the political idiom, however eclectic it may be, that English makes 
available, is already to distance caste practice as something alien to 
one’s subject position" (Dhareshwar 1993: 118). 
By "political idiom" Dhareshwar means a whole "semiotic system 
signifying modernity" (ibid.: 116) which has been made available 
through English but can be articulated perfectly well in other Indian 
languages as well.11 'Modernist' critiques of caste—like the one articu-
lated by my atheist interlocutors—allow upper caste subjects to disso-
ciate ideologically and experientially from caste by transforming it into 
a discursive object which, qua object, is necessarily located outside the 
subject and can thus be displaced onto the lower caste 'other'. Since 
this 'modernist' subject position is usually less available to lower cas-
tes, they tend to continue articulating their critiques in terms of caste 
which, in turn, reinforces the initial displacement: the lower castes’ 
insistence on suffering caste discrimination is considered to confirm 
that they have not yet been able to come out of a casteist mind-set 
themselves, as they continue to see caste everywhere—even where it 






























In a very similar way, caste is vehemently and unanimously rejected 
by atheists and, at the same time, it constantly encroaches upon 
them, when others accuse them of lingering or dissimulated casteism. 
Dhareshwar’s analysis is useful here, because it shows that caste is not 
only part of the cultural or religious background of atheism and, there-
fore, merely an object of atheist critique; rather, in the discursive envi-
ronment of 'post-Mandal India', caste is internal to its critique insofar 
as the subject position of 'castelessness' is itself inflected by caste. The 
question I am raising here is thus not whether atheist programmes 
deliver on humanist ideology by 'really' annihilating caste, but rather 
how atheists participate in, depend on, and relate to changing aes-
thetic formations of caste in order to produce an alternative aesthetic 
formation of atheist humanism.  
I argued above that atheist scenarios of "human mingling" trans-
form caste hierarchies into differential agency and sentiments which 
are distributed unequally between atheist activists and those whom 
they seek to make into equal and self-respecting individuals. Senti-
ments like heroism and self-respect are thus part of an affectively 
mediated social relationship which realises atheists’ social imaginary of 
humanism in the concrete form of an aesthetic formation. Agency and 
sentiments are not felt inside and then expressed; they are 'formed', 
that is made public and perceptible for self and others, by relating to 
caste in critical, transgressive, or dismissive ways. This aesthetic for-
mation of humanism is therefore still inflected by caste, because—even 
when trans-'formed' through transgression and disavowal—caste is 
never just an external object of ideological critique but remains impli-
cated in the spatial practices, material things, relations of power, 
behavioural habits, bodily reactions, and public sentiments in and 
through which its critique is put into practice. 
The example of atheist disavowals and practical transgressions of 
"sectarian" or communalist ideologies of caste and religion as well as 
an explicit endorsement of humanism does not automatically entail the 
absence of social hierarchies and inequality, but it might very well indi-
cate their transformation. My analysis locates the reason for the per-
sistence of such transformed hierarchies not primarily at the level of 
actors’ ideologies or intentions, but in what can be called their 'social 
aesthetics': the material, spatial, affective, and thus perceptible 
dimensions of the scenarios in which "sectarian" hierarchies are meant 
to be discarded, criticised, or transgressed. Following Deshpande and 
Ngai, I tried to capture this aesthetic quality of communal distinctions 






























describing them as a tone or colour of social relations. It furthermore 
registered in my interlocutors’ somewhat defeatist remark that caste 
was simply "in the blood" of Indians. 
The persistence and "stickiness" (Ahmed 2004: 89–92) of caste also 
surfaces as accusations of lingering casteism within the atheist move-
ment and challenges atheists’ sincerity: according to my interlocutors, 
'true' atheists cannot be casteist. Given that none of my interlocutors 
have ever come out in defence of caste, these accusations point be-
yond the failure of individuals or particular organisations and effective-
ly question whether atheists’ anti-caste activism in the form of "human 
mingling" is as such an efficacious means for social reconstruction. 
Many people I have met both within and outside the atheist move-
ment claim, for example, that the introduction of railways and the 
long-distance travel they enabled were much more effective in doing 
away with caste than all deliberate projects of social reform: during a 
twenty or thirty-hour train ride people of different castes were simply 
forced to mingle, sit next to each other, and eventually eat if not toge-
ther than at least in each other’s presence. If some of the atheist 
movement’s goals of social reconstruction seem to have been realised 
on their own and in the wake of much larger historical transformations 
underway in Indian society, deliberate programmes for the annihilation 
of caste might not be identifiable as a cause for social change but 
rather as part of it. 
By way of conclusion, I want to give room to the voice of another 
atheist activist, an acclaimed atheist orator called Katti Padma Rao. 
Especially in his function as a noted Dalit leader, Katti Padma Rao is 
sceptical—to say the least—about the castelessness of ex-upper caste 
atheists and the atheist movement in general. In one of our inter-
views, he argued that large-scale processes like globalisation and eco-
nomic liberalisation were in fact much more effective in alleviating cas-
te discrimination than his fellow atheists’ anti-caste activism. This is 
quite rare because most of my atheist interlocutors in Andhra Pradesh 
and Telangana adhere to leftist critiques of globalisation and identify 
neoliberal capitalism as a primary cause of social inequality and indeed 
a sort of pseudo-theism. Katti Padma Rao, however, asserted that: 
Untouchables want all this globalisation and liberalisation. They 
want it because when globalisation happened, the untouchable 
got a mobile phone, he got a TV. [They] brought cars, he got a 
car. […] The Hindus didn’t like that. Equal! Then there were Brah-
mins, they had a mobile phone, they had a telly. [Now] if a Brah-






























has books too. […] Before, there was sanskritization: They have 
these things, the others have those things. There were books, 
here was labour equipment, knives et cetera. Now? Equality! 
[laughs]. […] I mean, anybody is using these things: that is mar-
keting. What does marketing do? It has no caste. There is no 
caste for the market.12 
Katti Padma Rao continued to explain that nowadays Dalits wore bran-
ded clothes from London and "Colgate" addressed them as a lucrative 
target group for toothpaste products, while in the 1960s many Dalits 
did not even have a table in their houses or shirts on their bodies. He 
went on to explain that globalisation, liberalisation, and privatisation 
were beneficial and necessary for "those below" (kindavallu) but a loss 
for "the one on top" (paivadu). He was still critical of boundless consu-
merism and certain forms of aggressive capitalism, but he made the 
point that, as far as social mobility for Dalits was concerned, market 
capitalism was still preferable to sanskritisation. 
Katti Padma Rao’s account as well as the 'railway-argument' call into 
question the causal efficiency of atheist endeavours to annihilate caste 
through practices of "human mingling", because they portray the ate-
nuation of caste discrimination as a more or less unintentional epiphe-
nomenon of large-scale social change. Once social change is attributed 
to impersonal or abstract agencies like railways, globalisation, or the 
market, this alters what people deem appropriate as a means of anti-
communal social reform; however, it also impacts on the ways in 
which existing or desired social distinctions may be reclaimed and 
materialised. Such larger social and discursive transformations need to 
be seen in relation to tenacious and deeply entrenched aesthetic 
dimensions of social distinctions. It is by developing frameworks for 
more systematic analyses of such relations that we may gain a better 
understanding of, for example, the ways in which recent violence in 
the context of 'cow protection' campaigns relate to the long history of 
communal pluralism in South Asia—as well as the equally long history 
of attempts at transcending that pluralis
Endnotes 
1 Express Web Desk. 2016. Beef row: where it is illegal and what the law says. The Indian Express, 
July 27.,  
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/beef-madhya-pradesh-video-cow-
vigilantes-gau-rakshaks-2938751/ [retrieved 14.10.2016];  
Ghosh, Deepshikha. 2016. PM Modi hits out at cow vigilantes, says 'Gau Rakshak business makes 
me angry'. NDTV.com. July 8.  
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Pandit, Ambika. 2015. Muslim organisations demand complete ban on beef exports from India. 
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http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Muslim-organisations-demand-complete-ban-on-beef-
exports-from-India/articleshow/53658625.cms [retrieved 14.10.2016];  
Pattanaik, Devdutt. 2015. Holy cow, unholy violence. The Hindu, Oct. 6.,  
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/holy-cow-unholy-violence/article7727157.ece 
[retrieved 14.10.2016]. 
2 I use inverted commas as a reference to the supposed exceptionalism of 'Indian' secularism, as 
opposed to its 'Western' counterparts, which is usually seen in its decidedly benevolent and affir-
mative stance towards religion. As a political ideology and a project of governance—according to 
some commentators and politicians also as an inherent quality of Indian civilisation—Indian secu-
larism is neither itself irreligious nor does it regulate religions by keeping them out of politics and 
the public sphere; rather, its defining trait is seen in accommodating all religions with equal re-
spect so as to avert the corruption of India’s 'unity in diversity' into potentially violent forms of 
communalism (van der Veer 1994 and van der Veer 2001; Bhargava 1998; Needham & Sunder 
Rajan 2007; Tejani 2008; Bajpai 2015). Many aspects of this ideal understanding of Indian secula-
rism have been thoroughly scrutinised as far as their historical development and conceptual as 
well as practical shortcomings are concerned, but the taken-for-granted absence and virtual 
expulsion of irreligiosity from the conceptual scheme and actual regime of 'Indian' religious secu-
larism have largely escaped the critical radar. 
3 Unless otherwise noted, Indian terms in brackets are Telugu.  
4 "Atheist Centre." 2015.  
http://atheistcentre.in/ [accessed 14.10.2016]. 
5 The Atheist Centre and the Gora family had joined the Congress movement during the Quit 
India Movement in 1942 and has continued to take part in the Sarvodaya movement after inde-
pendence. The Atheist Centre is very proud of its nationalist credentials and sees no overt contra-
diction between their Gandhian values and their commitment to atheism. In fact, the Gora family 
argues that Gandhi talked about theist and religious concepts like god, soul force, or spirituality 
only in order to clothe his radical ideas in conventional language and thus make them palatable 
to a wider audience. They furthermore consider Gandhi to have been an atheist as far as his acti-
ons were concerned and, had he lived longer, he would have sooner or later matched his discour-
se as well (Gora 1988; Lavanam 1996; 2003; Lavanam & Lindley 2005). 
6 Birgit Meyer coined the concept of "aesthetic formation" as, among other things, a further 
development of Benedict Anderson’s concept of "imagined community" (1983) and defined it 
thus: "The term aesthetic formation, then, highlights the convergence of processes of forming 
subjects and the making of communities—as social formations. In this sense, "aesthetic forma-
tion" captures very well the formative impact of a shared aesthetics through which subjects are 
shaped by tuning their senses, inducing experiences, molding their bodies, and making sense, and 
which materializes in things [...]" (Meyer 2009: 7). 
7 This refers to the marriage of Gora’s and Saraswathi’s eldest daughter, Manorama, to a man cal-
led Arjun Rao, a collaborator of Gora’s with a Dalit family background; Lavanam, their second 
child, was married to Hemalatha who is the daughter of the famous Dalit/Christian poet, Gurram 
Jashuva. 
8 Shariff Gora. Hyderabad, January 14, 2014; recorded interview in English. 
9 According to Kim Knott, spaces are secular if they have no "necessary or apparent religious basis 
or reference" (2014: 36) and thus give space to a variety of heterogeneous actors to negotiate 
religious, secularist, or postsecularist standpoints, values, beliefs et cetera. Here, secular space 






























seems to be defined again by the absence of religion which allows the containment or rather the 
production of the religious and non-religious within it. I want to explore a different approach 
here, where space is not just the arena for the production of the religious/secular binary—or its 
rejection from a postsecular standpoint—but an affectively invested and discursively enfolded as-
pect of, using a phenomenological idiom, 'being–in–the–world' as secular or religious. 
10 In the middle ages, an agraharam was land, often linked to temples, which was donated to 
Brahmins by kings, whereas today it refers more generally to exclusively Brahmin neighborhoods 
or settlements. In the South-Indian Non-Brahmin movement, the term agraharam was further-
more used in order to criticise the cultural and political dominance of Brahmins in the colonial 
public sphere, for example, by describing the Indian National Congress or certain administrative 
bodies as a Brahmin agraharam (cf. Pandian 2007: 100–1). 
11 Sheldon Pollock (2006) and Sudipta Kaviraj (2010) argue that the relationship between English 
and so-called 'vernaculars' indexes social hierarchies which have a pre-history in the relationship 
between Sanskrit and regional (Sanskrit: desi) languages. Kaviraj, in particular, focuses on the 
problem of linguistic restrictions on insubordination in a situation where local forms of protest 
would have been forced to inscribe themselves into Sanskrit discourses if they were to aspire to 
any supra-regional influence. Both Kaviraj and Dhareshwar imply that supra-regional or, in 
Pollock’s terms, cosmopolitan political discourses—rather than just linguistic codes—tend to pro-
duce discourses of conservatism or reaction by virtue of being the idiom of elites. As a conse-
quence, criticism of caste would remain ineffective as long as it remains expressible only in the 
discourse or political idiom of 'English modernity'—irrespective of whether or not it is articulated 
in the English language.  
12  Katti Padma Rao. Ponnur, December 31., 2014; recorded interview in Telugu, italics indicate 
English in original. 
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